In the past decade, the electric utility industry in many countries around the world has been undergoing fundamental structural changes to introduce competition and enhance efficiency. The traditional vertically integrated utility is deregulated to open up the system to the market, in response to the pressures of privatization and customer demands. Electricity and services can be sold and purchased as a commodity through different market structures. Under this deregulated and competitive environment, economics and profitability have become the major concern of every electric supplier, and each supplier will act in his/her own selfinterest in this new environment.
Among the proposed market structures, the electric auction market has been widely experienced and implemented in different countries with different protocols. Market participants-electric suppliers, and distribution companies-are required to submit their sealed bids to the auction market to compete for power energy. All participants winning the auction will be paid based on the rules agreed upon by the participants. Thus the bidding strategy which is essential for a successful business in this auction market is becoming one of the most important issues in the electric industry. Market participants can improve their benefits dramatically by strategic bidding.
Developing bidding strategies for competitive suppliers have been studied by many researchers in recent years. Game theory [1] is naturally the first choice to deal with this issue, and much work has been done using this traditional theory. In [2] , a Nash game approach is used to study the pricing strategy in the deregulated power marketplace, where each participant has incomplete information about his rivals. A method, which uses Cournot non-cooperative game theory to determine the optimal supply quantity for each power producer in an oligopoly electricity market, is presented in [3] . The results show that the estimation accuracy of production cost functions of rivals plays an important role in this market. Different electricity market rules and their effects on bidding behaviors in a non-congestion grid are analyzed in [4] . The authors conclude that generators can take advantage of congestion in their strategic bidding behavior.
But game theory is not the only solution to this problem. In fact, due to the complexity, dynamics and uncertainty of the restructured electricity market, evolutionary computation algorithms and reinforcement learning are receiving increasing attention recently and are becoming major tools in solving this problem. A genetic algorithm is developed in [5] to evolve the bidding strategies of participants in a double auction market. Markov Decision Process is used to optimize the bidding decisions to maximize the expected reward over a planning horizon in [6] , The optimal bidding problem is modeled as a stochastic optimization problem in [7] , and, a Monte Carlo approach based method and an optimization based method are developed to solve this problem. In [8] , an agent-based simulation method is proposed, in which each agent uses a "naive reinforcement learning algorithm" to explore and exploit successful bidding strategy. However, this approach fails to use public information of the market and to combine each agent's business type (risk averse or opportunistic) in developing the bidding strategy for each agent.
In this paper, the bidding strategy is studied from the supplier's point of view in a day-ahead electricity auction market, and the bidding process is treated as a dynamic and continuous process. Each supplier is designed to have the ability to use the public information of the market and be able to explore and exploit his optimal (successful) bidding strategy over the bidding process. The business type of each supplier is considered here. It is assumed that no supplier possesses the market power, that can be used to manipulate the market price to satisfy his/her own benefit. Because the bidding information of each supplier is confidential, each supplier is also assumed to have only information on his/her own cost and the publicly available information of market, but lacks information on other rivals. The market suppliers are also assumed to be so many that it is very difficult for each supplier to estimate other suppliers' bidding behaviors. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model of electricity auction market. Section 3 presents the evolution strategy used to evolve the bidding strategy of a supplier. Section 4 shows the simulation results which are based on a multi-agent simulation method. Section 5 gives the conclusion and presents the future work.
A day-ahead electricity auction market
A day-ahead electricity auction market with no demand-side bidding is assumed here. In this day-ahead auction market, all suppliers wishing to sell power tomorrow must submit their bids today to an Independent System Operator (ISO), who will clear the market, determine which supplier should be used to meet the forecasted load, and check if the security and reliability constraints of the power system is satisfied. The relationship of the ISO and suppliers is shown in Fig. 1 .
Everyday suppliers submit their sealed bids with price ($/MWh) and quantity (MW) at which they are willing to sell during the next day to compete for the power load forecasted by the ISO . An example of forecasted power load by the ISO is shown in Fig.2 . For simplicity, a daily bids is used here, that is, each supplier submits one bid everyday to compete for power load over all 24-hour of the next day.
The bids from suppliers are ranked by the ISO from the cheapest to the most expensive to construct a supply curve, see Fig.3 . The ISO will then select the cheapest supplier until the load of each hour of the next day is met. It should be pointed out that we regulate in this clearing algorithm , when the bidding prices are equal, the supplier with smaller bidding quantity is given the first priority to be accepted to protect the medium-and- small size enterprises. At the end of each trading day, each supplier is notified of his dispatched power (MWh), which is the quantity called into operation during the 24-hour of the next day, and the daily market price ($/MWh), which is assumed to be the only publicly available information to each supplier in this paper. The market price is defined to be the average bidding price Pav9 of dispatched suppliers as follows:
where n is the number of suppliers in the electricity auc- Here, c is a constant which represents the supplier's type -risk averse or opportunistic. When the supplier is risk averse, c should be small, and vice versa. T is a parameter that will change over the evolution process. Examples of a1 and a2 are shown in Fig. 4 .
As shown in Fig.4 , when Po is larger than the market price Pavg, if the target utilization rate of the previous day is satisfied, the supplier will develop prudently the bidding price of the next day, using a normal distribution with smaller standard deviation to reduce the risk of losing in the market; If the target utilization rate of the previous day is not reached, the supplier will generate a smaller bidding price of the next day by subtracting a random value from the previous day's bidding price, using a normal distribution with larger standard deviation, to meet the target utilization rate firstly.
To ensure the supplier to be adaptive to the dynamically competitive environment, and be able to explore and exploit the optimal bidding strategy over the evolution process, we introduce the success rule [11] to evolve (10) where r(k) is the success ratio of satisfaction of target utilization rate on the generator during the last k trading days; Ratio is the target success ratio to be satisfied; and ci=1.22 and cd=0.82 regulate the increase and decrease rates of the parameter T, respectively. In this first report, ci and Cd are fixed for simplicity. To introduce the adaptation mechanism into ci and Cd is a future work. The maximum and the minimum of parameter T are set to 8.0 and 0.01, respectively.
If the target success ratio is satisfied, the supplier will bid boldly with lager steps to maximize the profit; if not, the supplier will bid cautiously to meet his/her requirement on utilization rate of generator, and this will finally lead to meet his/her profit-maximizing goal in a long term.
Simulation results
We have developed a multi-agent based simulation method to test the bidding strategy we proposed in the above section. The application of multi-agent based simulation method to deal with issues in deregulated electricity industry is a newly promising research area [13] [14] . In this paper, each adaptive agent represents a supplier participating in this day-ahead auction market, and is able to explore and exploit the optimal bidding strategy to meet his/her profit-maximizing goal in this competitive environment .
In the early stage of the electricity deregulation process, electricity consumers in many markets are protected by capped price, as did in the California's electricity market. Consumers have little awareness that they should alter their consumption patterns and manage their power demand . The market demand shows little elasticity at the current stage . Therefore, two cases of market power load forecasted by the ISO are used here for simulations. One is a fixed load case, in that the forecasted load is the same as shown in Fig. 2 and remains unchanged during the evolution process. To show the increasing power demand in reality , the other is a Table 1 . Max. generation capacities and initial bidding prices of 10 rivals changing load case, in that the forecasted load of each hour shown in Fig. 2 will increase 3 (MW) everyday during the simulation. As a result, the hourly power load of everyday will be larger than the power supply in this case when the evolution is over 667 trading days.
It should be pointed out that all agents in our simulations will bid their maximum generation capacity as their bidding quantity on every trading day. The unit cost Ci of each supplier is set to 8.0 ($/MWh). The target utilization rate and success ratio of all agents are specified to 1.0 and 0.8, respectively. The success rule is applied every 10 trading days. The ceiling price of the market is set to 20.0 ($/MWh). And the bidding strategy is allowed to evolve for 1000 trading days.
Simulation case 1:
To test the feasibility of the proposed bidding strategy, we show an example of an agent A, who use the proposed supplier bidding strategy to develop his/her bidding price to compete against 10 rivals. All rivals in this simulation case are assumed to just bid their initial bidding prices everyday with a variation range of ±10%. The maximum generation capacity of agent A is set to 300 (MW). The maximum generation capacities and initial bidding prices of 10 rivals are given in Table 1 . As can be seen from the generation levels of all agents, no supplier possesses the market power since no agent has the dominant market share.
The bidding prices of agent A in both power load cases are shown in Fig. 5 . As shown in this figure, agent A is forced to bid price in the range of 11$/MWh-12$/MWh in the fixed load case, which is a stationary noise environment; while, in the changing load case, agent A is successful in exploring and exploiting the optimal bidding strategy, which varies with the change of power load, to meet his/her profit-maximizing goal. The result shows that the proposed bidding strategy is capable of developing optimal bidding strategy in stationary and non stationary environment. Table 2 shows the effect of business type, which is represented here by the parameter c, on the reward of agent A in this simulation case. Each reward shown in Table 2 is the average of average everyday reward of agent A from 100 simulations. As shown in this table, business type plays a very important role in achieving the profit-maximizing goal of agent A. When c is too large, that is , agent A is of opportunistic type, reward obtained decreases since agent A faces larger risk of not being accepted by the ISO. If c is too small, reward obtained also decreases because agent A bids prices close to the public available market price and has little ability of exploring optimal bidding strategy for himself. The bidding prices of agent A in the fixed load case and the changing load case. The parameter c in these two load cases are set to 0.25 and 0.75, respectively. In this case, we investigate the effect of business type on the market price. We assume that agent A is still competing with the 10 rivals, whose maximum generation capacities are shown in Table 1 . But this time, all rivals are assumed to use the proposed supplier bidding strategy to develop their bidding prices. All the initial bidding prices of agent A and his rivals are set to 15$/MWh here. The simulation results are plotted in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 .
In Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , all the parameters c of agents in curve 1 are set to 0.25, and 1.0 in curve 3, respectively. And the parameters c of agents in curve 2 are randomly selected from the range of [0.2, 1.2] to represent a simulation in heterogeneous agents environment. Fig. 6 shows that, even under the discriminatory pricing rule, in the fixed load case, where power supply is bigger than the power demand, intense competition among the agents forces the market price down to a lower price level, which is close to the agents' truly unit cost Ci (8.0$/MWh). We can also see from this figure that the curve 3 has the quickest decrease of the market price and largest oscillation at the end of the evolving process than two others because agents in curve 3 are opportunistic. On the other hand, competition among the agents with small parameters c=0.25 leads to a slow decrease and lower market price at the end of the trading days, because of the prudently bidding of all agents.
The difference of market prices in the changing load case, which is resulted from the competition among agents with different business types, is shown in Fig. 7 . It is very interesting to find that, due to the strategic bidding of agents, the market prices go up to the market ceiling price on about 400 trading day, even though the power supply at this time is still bigger than the power demand.
Simulation case 3:
We compare the proposed bidding strategy with another simple bidding strategy for suppliers, which is a simplified version of Table 3 . Average daily rewards of agents at different Max. generation capacity levels using different bidding strategies in the electricity auction market ding strategy for suppliers in a day-ahead electricity auction market. Suppliers' types were included in this approach, and their effects on the market price were analyzed. Simulation results, which were based on a multi-agent approach, have shown the validity of the proposed bidding strategy.
Although the proposed strategy is some kind of simple at the current stage and a practical strategy may need to take into consideration many constraints and parameters, it will still provide us some valuable information on market design and the supplier bidding strategy. It is believed that developing bidding strategy under different market designs can provide a deep insight into the complex new electricity markets and identify how rules can be designed to improve the performance of the market. How to extend our methodology to study markets where uniform pricing rule is adopted will be our future work.
In this paper, we developed the bidding strategy from a supplier's point of view, without considering the demand-side bidding. In practice, the demand from the consumers is a function of the market price. When the market price goes up, the demand will decrease to some extent. When this relationship is considered, there should be an impact on the profits of suppliers and will eventually affect the suppliers' bidding strategies.
Moreover, we just used the bidding data of the previous day to develop the bids of the next day. In reality, historical bidding data, including the publicly available information of the market, play a very important role in developing the optimal bidding strategy for suppliers. It is believed that combining the technique of artificial intelligence with the proposed bidding strategy, such as using the neural network to predict the market price and power demand, will decrease risks facing the suppliers and increase greatly the profits for them in this daily repeated auction market.
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